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Abstract We develop a generalised framework for pure bundling where
buyer tastes for two goods are assumed to follow a normal distribution. In
the literature optimal bundling decisions have been considered under the
assumption that the weights of the two goods are xed and equal. The only
consideration is then to choose the prot maximising optimal price. Our
approach is di¤erent and much more realistic. The monopolist rst decides
on the optimal weights of the two goods and in the second stage derives
the prot maximising bundle price. Welfare and policy implications of our
approach are derived and comparisons are made with those of the xed
weights approach.
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1 Introduction
Bundling has been discussed as an instrument of second degree price dis-
crimination with distinct original contributions by a number of authors.
Among them are Adams and Yellen (1976), McAfee, McMillan and Whin-
ston (1989) and Schmalensee (1984). There is also an original contribution
by Stigler (1968). Typically a uniform distribution was used to describe the
valuation of consumers for two goods. On the other hand, Schmalensee used
the bivariate normal distribution.
In Dassiou and Glycopantis (2006, 2008), using the uniform distribution
we show that mixed bundling (where the consumers self-select among buying
neither good, only one good, or both goods bundled together) leads to an
increase in prots and if practiced by a monopsonist to an increase in trade
for its trading partners.
The discussions in the literature have produced concrete results. We
refer to these and where appropriate we explain the contribution in the
present paper. We assume that the buyers valuations of the two goods are
distributed according to a bivariate normal distribution. The monopolist
rm uses a pure bundling approach through the construction of a composite
good. We will explain this approach in detail below.
Bundling increases the proportion of valuations around the mean by
reducing the dispersion among the buyers. While this is good news in the
case of low marginal costs, in the opposite case the seller will want to increase
rather than decrease the dispersion of valuations. This is because if the
marginal costs are greater than the mean valuation, bundling will decrease
prots. By reducing the size of the lucrative fraction of buyers whose mean
valuation exceeds the marginal cost of the bundle.
This suggests that the manipulation of the mean valuation is as impor-
tant. Yet this is largely neglected in the bundling literature; instead the
focus has been on the fact that bundling reduces dispersion and this allows
the monopolistic rm to extract more of the consumers surplus. In our pa-
per we study a form of pure bundling which is not mean preserving. We
return to this point below.
A second point regards the manipulation of dispersion. The standard
deviations of the valuations for the goods in a bundle are sub-additive unless
the goods are perfectly correlated. In other words, bundling reduces the
e¤ective dispersion of the reservation prices. However bundling is based on
the conventional approach of assigning equal weights for the two goods in
a bundle. Schmalensee notes that if symmetry (i.e. 1 ' 2) does not hold,
pure bundling is less likely to be prot or welfare enhancing. He therefore
argues that in this case the mixed bundling approach is preferable.
However, if the weights of pure bundling can be optimized by the rm
this may no longer be the case. The ability to set weights may e¤ectively
resolve the problem of a lack of symmetry in standard deviations without
having to resort to a mixed bundling approach. Weight manipulation may
ameliorate the desire to reduce dispersion. Moreover, it might also lead to an
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increase in the weight of a good which despite its relatively higher dispersion
has a substantially higher mean valuation.
There are also a number of results in the literature that highlight the
importance of the correlation in tastes. Crawford (2008) notes that the
heterogeneity reduction in tastes achieved by bundling networks is greater
the more negatively correlated the tasted for the goods included are. Using
bundle-sized pricing, Chu et al. (2010) show that if consumers can select
themselves which goods (theatrical plays in their example) to include in a
bundle of pre determined size and price, they will include goods for which
tastes are positively correlated. While this is still prot enhancing, it is less
so than that of combining goods whose valuations are negatively correlated
as in the Crawford example.
Issues connected explicitly with risk aversion have been considered by
De Graba (2005) who introduces the idea of price discrimination without
bundling. He nds that the rm will be willing to sacrice some prot in
order to increase the probability of making a sale to a large purchaser. Dana
(1998, 1999a, 1999b) argues that price dispersion occurs because of stochas-
ticity, and that rms set di¤erent prices, including discounts, to smooth out
demand and reduce uncertainty. The work of Dana is discussed in Gaggero
and Piga (2009) within the context of pricing strategies pursued by airlines.
Dana and De Graba show that the existence of price di¤erentials is a
defensive mechanism for responding to uncertainty, rather than an ag-
gressive mechanism for extracting surplus through price discrimination as
it is typically stressed in the bundling literature. In our model risk aversion
intensies the desire to reduce dispersion. The reduction in dispersion may
enable the rm to better capture consumer surplus and this will lead to an
increase in prots. The desire to reduce dispersion may be either tempered
or strengthened by the desire to increase the average (mean) demand for
the bundle.
In the literature the weights of the two goods in the bundle are taken as
xed. For example, Schmalensee assumes that the two goods participate in
the bundle with a ratio 1:1. The rm determines the optimal bundle price
through the maximisation of its prot function. Our paper breaks away
from this tradition. We rst formulate a utility function of the rm based
on the composition of the bundle means, variances, correlation in tastes and
the rms degree of risk aversion. The weights of the two goods are chosen
by the rm using a portfolio maximisation approach. It is then that the
monopolist proceeds to determine through prot maximisation the bundle
price. Comparing our optimal pure bundling to Schmalensees, we show
that in our framework the optimal relative weights are equal only when the
di¤erence in the net (of costs) means of the valuations for the two goods
is equal to the degree of absolute risk aversion times the di¤erence in the
variances.
Our analysis has important policy implications. The rst important
point is that while portfolio optimisation attempts by a company to re-
duce dispersion through bundling may be detrimental to consumer surplus,
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this may be counteracted by the fact that at the same time an increase in
the bundle mean may be achieved, which is both prot as well as consumer
surplus enhancing. The second, more striking point is that the desire to
increase the bundle mean may ultimately lead a choice of weights such that
the result is an increase rather than a decrease in dispersion. In this case,
bundling will lead to a further increase in consumer surplus and hence it be
an unambiguously welfare enhancing practice.
Section 2 sets a preliminary background to the main investigation. It
considers the case of unbundled sales and derives comparative static results
for prots, consumer surplus and social welfare with respect to the mean
and dispersion of the normal distribution which describes the consumers
valuations for a single good. The results are of relevance for the next section,
as the bundle is in e¤ect a composite good. Section 3 discusses in detail our
approach to pure bundling where the consumer valuations of the two goods
are given by a bivariate normal distribution. It analyses how the optimal
weights and then the bundle price are obtained. It derives comparative
static results and makes comparisons with the conventional xed weights
approach. Section 4 concludes the discussion.
2 Results based on separate sales of goods
Our model is based on Schmalensees specication. We examine briey the
case of one good and derive comparative static results that we will use in
our analysis of pure bundling. We are interested in the e¤ect of changes in
the mean and dispersion on prots, the consumer surplus and total welfare.
Assuming a density function of buyers for a single good sold separately
g(x); the demand for this good can be written as:
Q(P ) =
1Z
P
g(x)dx: (1)
g(x) is the underlying distribution of the buyers valuations for the good and
Q(P ) is the cumulative distribution. Each consumer who has a valuation for
the good greater than its price buys one unit of the good. This valuation is
described by g(x) which is assumed to follow the normal distribution with
mean and standard deviation  and .
Let f(t) be the standard normal density function, and dene:
1  F (x) = 1 
xZ
 1
f(t)dt: (2)
F (x), the cumulative distribution function, is everywhere strictly increasing
and it is straightforward to show that:
F 0(x) = f(x); F 00(x) = df(x)
dx
=  xf(x);
1R
x
tf(t) = f(x); f(x)1 F (x) > x:
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The demand for a single good is thus given by Q(P ) = 1   F (P 

).
Below we will examine the impact on prots and on consumer surplus of
changes in the mean and the dispersion.
Calculating the derivatives Q0(P ) and Q00(P ) we see that the demand
function is decreasing and strictly convex for P > , and strictly concave
for P < : We can think of the curvature of the demand function as being
measured by A =  Q00(P )
Q0(P ) =
P 
2
. A has the same sign as Q00(P ), which is
negative for P < ; A < 0 is similar to the absolute risk aversion parameter
applied to a utility function. For a concave function of utility of demand,
its absolute risk aversion measure  ( > 0) is enhanced by A in this case
(e.g.  >j A j). We will return to this discussion in the next section.
The prot function of the supplying rm also follows the normal distri-
bution as it is linear in demand:
 = (P   C)(1  F (P   

)): (3)
Prot maximisation results to the following FOC and SOC respectively:
(1  F (P
   

)) =
P    C

f(
P    

); (4)
(P    C)(P    ) < 22: (5)
Combining the price cost margin condition P
 C
P
= 1

; where  is the ab-
solute value of the elasticity of demand, with f(x)1 F (x) > x we obtain:
(P    C)(P    ) <2: (6)
The above means that the SOC is always satised. It can be re-written as:
+ C  
p
(  C)2 + 42
2
< P  <
+ C +
p
(  C)2 + 42
2
(7)
The inclusion of P  =  in the above interval means that the demand, and
through it the prot function, are not globally concave.
We need to obtain the e¤ect of a change in the parameters of the demand
on the prot maximising optimal price. From implicit di¤erentiation of the
FOC with respect to  and invoking relation (6) is is easy to show that:
0 <
dP 
d
< 1: (8)
Similarly,
dP 
d
=
(P    C)(P    )2   [2P    (+ C)]2
(P    C)(P    )  22
1

: (9)
It is important to establish conditions for the sign of the change in opti-
mum price with respect to the dispersion. The above two results are used
repeatedly below in calculating the various comparative static results. Using
straightforward calculations we establish the theorem below.
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Theorem 1 For P  >  we have that dP

d
> 0. For P  <  we have that
dP
d
< 0 unless
+C+
p
( C)2+42
2 > P
 > +C:2
This means that a higher dispersion raises the price when the latter is
above the mean. A higher dispersion will continue to do so even if the price
is a little below the mean (i.e. if P  is larger than +C2 without violating
the SOC upper boundary for P ). Once the price is signicantly below the
mean a higher dispersion reduces the price.
Next, we wish to consider the impact mean and dispersion changes on
the maximum prot. Taking d

d
and using the envelope theorem we obtain:
d
d
= (P    C)

f(
P    

)

1

= (1  F (P
   

)): (10)
Invoking the properties of the cumulative distribution function we obtain
that 0 < d

d
< 1: Moreover we have d
2
d2
> 0: Hence  is an increasing,
convex function of :
We also obtain:
d
d
= (
P    C

)(
P    

)f(
P    

) = (
P    

)(1  F (P
   

)): (11)
It therefore follows that  is increasing in  for P  >  and decreasing for
P  < :
We next examine the consumer surplus, CS, given by the sum of the
valuations which exceed the price1 :
CS =
1Z
P
(x  P )f(x)dx = CS = f(P 

)  (P   )

1  F (P 

)

This implies that, CS jP=P= f(P
 

)

1  (P )(P C)
2

: This means
that the consumer surplus is strictly positive unless  = 0: Hence, the ex-
istence of dispersion in demand gives the consumers the opportunity to
capture some of the welfare in society, while in the case where  = 0 all
consumers valuations are the same and nobody extracts a surplus. Below
we examine under what circumstances CS jP=P is an increasing function
of dispersion.
Note that @CS
@P
=  

1  F (P 

)

: Therefore the consumer surplus is
a strictly decreasing function of price. It is instructive to split between the
direct and indirect e¤ect:
dCS
d
jP=P= f(P
   

) +
@P 
@
@CS
@P 
jP=P ; (12)
1 For a detailed analysis see Dassiou & Glycopantis (2011) where derivation of
formulae and proofs are obtained in the text and in a mathematical appendix.
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which means that the direct e¤ect of dispersion on consumer surplus is
always positive.
For P  < , the consumer surplus is an increasing function of  always,
as both e¤ects are positive unless P  > +C:2 . This implies that the share
of the consumer surplus in total surplus is larger the smaller dispersion is.
As we show in the next section, one of the reasons (albeit not the only one)
that may drive the rm into using pure bundling with exible weights is to
manipulate dispersion.
On the other hand, if P  > , then the indirect e¤ect is now negative
and hence the overall impact depends on whether the direct or indirect
e¤ect dominates.
Finally by adding together the producer and consumer surplus we have
that:
W = f(
P   

) + (  C)

1  F (P   

)

: (13)
Straightforward calculations show that:
@W
@P
jP=P=  P
   C

f(
P   

) < 0; (14)
dW
d
jP=P= [1  F (P
   

)](2  @P

@
)]: (15)
As dW
d
jP=P= dCSd + d

d
and d

d
= (P
 C)

f(P
 

) we also have that:
dCS
d
= [1  F (P
   

)](1  @P

@
): (16)
Given (8), the above two relations imply that both W  and CS are
increasing functions of the mean valuation.
Furthermore we can obtain:
dW
d
jP=P= f

P    


(P    C)2   22
(P    C)(P    )  22

: (17)
The above means that if the prot maximising price is within
 
C  p2;C +p2 ;
welfare is an increasing function of dispersion. Using the normal distribution
frequency tables we can conclude that for P  2 ( 0:147; +0:147) wel-
fare is a decreasing function of dispersion. We focus on the range of values
for which P  < :
For P  which is is less than  and greater than the critical value   
0:147, we have that d

d
< 0 and dW

d
< 0: As both prots and welfare are
decreasing functions of dispersion, its reduction is benecial to society as a
whole as it also increases welfare. This means that a reduction in dispersion
will, in this case, be benecial to society as a whole. However this range of
values for P  corresponds to just 7% of the total range of values that the
optimal price can take.
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If P  falls below this critical value then d

d
< 0 while dCS

d
; dW

d
> 0:
In other words, the desire of a prot maximising rm to decrease dispersion
can damage both consumer surplus as well as overall welfare.2
The above comparative static results are important for the bundling
analysis and conclusions below.
3 Two stage pure bundling and comparisons with previous
formulations
3.1 The framework of the analysis
The setting of optimal weights by a risk averse rm in constructing a pure
bundle, and the willingness to sacrice prots in the process of reducing risk
can be better understood in the context of two articles that have inspired
our approach.
Eckel and Smith (1992) focus their analysis on the cost side of things.
The rm manipulates the dispersion of a convex cost function using a portfo-
lio optimisation approach. By setting prices for the di¤erent demand groups
that determine their contribution in total demand, expected outputs are af-
fected and through them expected costs.
Anam and Chiang (2006) look at a risk averse monopolist. The rm
faces two di¤erent markets with stochastic and correlated demands. They
note that the ability to price discriminate if combined with risk aversion may
lead to unconventional results. In its drive to reduce dispersion the rm may
decide to price the good with the more elastic demand but also more risk a
higher price. Hence the conventional direction of third price discrimination
may be reversed if the sacrice in expected prot is more than compensated
for by the corresponding decrease in prot risk exposure.
We employ a portfolio optimisation approach; however unlike Eckel and
Smith, this is not mean preserving. We show the existence of risk aver-
sion may mean that the bundle weights chosen by the monopolist may not
only lead to a change in the bundle mean, but also to an increase in the
bundle dispersion. In this case, the conventional result of an equal weights
bundling rm where pure bundling is used as an instrument of reduction in
the dispersion of valuations is reversed. This is analogous to the Anam and
Chiangs possibility of a reversion of the conventional result in third degree
price discrimination.
As we discuss below the motives of altering the mean and the dispersion
can be both in the same direction or in opposite directions. The consumer
and welfare implications in the latter case will depend on which of the two
e¤ects dominates over the other. The existence of risk aversion from the side
of the rm may ameliorate or even reverse competition policy concerns that
2 Of course when demand is strictly convex (P  > ), the dispersion increasing
behaviour of a prot maximinsing rm will be benecial to society as well for as
long as P  > + 0:147:
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bundling may be damaging to the interests of consumers; in fact in some
instances the bundle dispersion in the valuations of the consumers may be
end up to be super-additive (e.g. larger than that of the separate sales, 1+
2) rather than sub-additive.
We analyse briey below how the rm determines its portfolio of goods in
the bundle. We derive comparative static results for the optimal composition
of goods in the bundle. On the basis of this choice the rm then chooses the
optimal bundle price. The comparative statics results derived in Section 2
are used in comparing the consumer and welfare implications of our results
to those of the xed weights approach by Schmalensee.
3.2 Step one: Optimal weights in xed bundling
We start our analysis with a packaged good, a unit of which is dened. In
a way analogous to the previous section, each consumer if he/she purchases
the package has a one unit demand for it. A unit of the composite good
consists of a given total number of individual units of Good 1 and Good
2. These goods are measured in similar units, for example their weights.
Although throughout we are concerned with one unit of the packaged good,
its composition may vary. Costs, means and standard deviations are all
perfectly divisible into fractions of less than one.
For example imagine a package in mobile phone services that both o¤ers
text messages and phone calls (all measured in minutes) for a given monthly
fee (bundle price). If the bundle consists of say, 300 phone calls and 600 text
messages, this means that one third of the bundle is phone calls and the
other two thirds is text messages. Hence 1 package has 900 minutes.
The decision that the monopolist has to make is rst to optimally divide
this package into texts and phone calls, and second to price it. We set as 
the relative weight of Good 1 (phone calls,  = 13 ) and as 1   the relative
weight of Good 2 (texts) in the package. Normalising to an overall sum of
2 we obtain k = 2 = 0:67 and 2   k = 2(1   ) = 1:33 respectively3 .
The decision that each consumer then has to make is whether to buy this
package, i.e. the 900 minutes with the weights and price o¤ered by the
monopolist.
A number of examples one can think of this type of bundling belong
to the family of goods that can be digitized, i.e. information goods, where
marginal costs are low and constant. We draw our inspiration from the paper
by Crampes and Hollander (2005) and that by Crawford, which explain that
TV bundles may be composed by combining movies and sport channels.
Optimisation is a two stage approach. In the rst step when determin-
ing the optimal composition in the bundle we assume risk aversion from the
point of view of the monopolist. Once the optimal bundle composition has
3 It must be stressed that the use of k is only for computational convenience in
the calculations that follow below, and in no way implies 2 units of the composite
good.
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been set we then proceed to the second step of the calculation of optimal
prots. Hence risk aversion is incorporated in the construction of the op-
timal bundle, which is an internal calculation; the rm is then risk neutral
in the calculation of the bundle price which will maximise prots.
The rms objective before it sets the bundle price PB , is to maximise
its expected utility, given the bivariate normal distribution f(x; y)4 of the
buyers reservation prices (valuations). The rm decides whether it is worth-
while to bundle and if so at what relative weights. In the second stage the
rm calculates the bundle price5 . As we have mentioned, by manipulating
the weights we can a¤ect dispersion and the level of demand.
The marginal densities are given by
fX(x) =
1p
2x
exp(  (x x)222x );
fY (y) =
1p
2y
exp(  (y y)222y )
The valuations x and y for Goods 1 and 2 can be in money form, and
so will be the valuation of the bundle xk + y(2   k). The rm will rst
set weights to the two goods to maximise its utility function. The utility
function is determined by the valuations distribution characteristics (mean,
variance and correlation) as well as the degree of risk aversion by the rm.
We will use the term  to express risk aversion; this will reect the rms
sensitivity to dispersion and other risk aversion factors. We assume that 
is constant and positive, as in the case of constant absolute risk aversion.
Hence,
4 The underlying distribution for the buyers valuations for the two goods x
(Good 1 valuation) and y (Good 2 valuation) is
f(x; y) = 1
2xy
p
1 2
exp(  z
2(1 2)
);
where z = (x x)
2
2x
  2(x r)((y y)
xy
+
(y y)
2
2y
and  is the correlation coe¢cient
of the reservation valuations.
5 If PB is the bundle price then the demand function can be written as:
1Z
 1
1Z
PB y
f(x; y)dxdy
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maxJ =
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
  exp[  (xk + y(2  k))]f(x; y)dxdy6 ;7
This means that we wish to maximise J , the utility function of the rm
through a choice of the weights in the bundle. Using the moment generating
function,MX;Y (t1; t2) = exp[(xt1+y(2  t2)+ 
2
xt
2
1+2xyt1t2+
2
yt
2
2
2 ], with
t1 =  k and t2 =  (2  k) we can re-write the optimisation function as:
maxJ =   exp[ ak1   (2  k)2 + ( )2 
2
1k
2+212k(2 k)+22(2 k)2
2 ]
Applying a monotonic transformation to the above the problem simpli-
es into:
maxK = 1k + 2(2  k)  
2
1k
2+212k(2 k)+22(2 k)2
2 .
In other words the rm wishes to create an optimal bundle, where the
weights of the two participating goods are such that the expected utility
from the bundle is maximised given the valuations by the consumers and
the production costs. In determining the bundle the rm will also take into
account the costs of producing the good. We therefore adjust the means
so that they are set as net from their corresponding costs. The rm max-
imises with respect to  the following revenue certainty equivalent function
which accounts for the loss of utility that the rm experiences given its risk
aversion:
(1 C1)+(2 C2)(1 ) 221 212(1 ) (1 )222 : (18)
Theorem 2 For i   Ci > j   Cj ; a positive weight for good j requires
that i j   (Ci Cj) < 2i(i  j). Hence the decision of whether to
pure bundle or not, as well as how to balance the goods within the bundle,
are both endogenous decisions.
6 The rms utility function has a constant absolute risk aversion functional
form   exp[ (xk + y(2   k)]: If  = 0 then the utility function is of the linear
form xk + y(2  k) (Kreps, 1990, p.85). Hence, expected value maximisation will
be of the form
maxJ = max
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
(xk + y(2  k))]f(x; y)dxdy = max[k1 + (2  k)2]
The above expression indicates that in this case the rm has zero dispersion
sensitivity, corresponding to the case of a risk neutral rm. So for maximising the
rm will need to assign all the weight to either good 1 or good 2 depending on
which of the two goods has the highest mean (or net mean). Hence, the weights
will be either (0; 2) or (2; 0).
7 We show in Dassiou & Glycopantis (2011) that if the utility function is mul-
tiplicative and the correlation coe¢cient between the valuations of the two goods
is equal to zero, the combination k = 2  k = 1 is optimal. This corresponds to
Schmalensees type of conventional bundling.
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Proof By rst order and second order di¤erentiation of the above expres-
sion with respect to ; we derive the F.O.C. and the S.O.C. The S.O.C. is
satised for  > 0:8 From the FOC we obtain the optimal split of the two
unit bundle between the two goods as set out below
k = 2 =
(2   1)  (C2   C1)  22(2   1)
 (21 + 22   212)
;
and
2  k = 2(1  ) = (1   2)  (C1   C2)  21(1   2) (21 + 22   212)
: (19)
The denominator in the above ratios is the S.O.C. , and hence negative.
Footnote 6 derived previously explains why corner solutions will apply in the
case where  = 0: It follows that unless (i j) (Ci Cj) < 2i(i j);
good j will receive a zero weight within the bundle. This implies either the
deletion of an entire product line from the bundle or, less drastically, that
the rm needs to consider the use of mixed bundling. 
Obviously for  > 0, a necessary (though not su¢cient) requirement for
a strictly positive share of the good with the lower mean net of cost, say
j, is that the dispersion of tastes in good j multiplied with the correlation
coe¢cient is smaller that the dispersion for other good, i.e. i > j . This
is obviously increasingly binding as  increases. On the other hand, if  < 0
this is no longer a requirement.
From inspection of the equalities in (19) and assuming that the weights
are strictly positive it follows that:
i) For i Ci > j  Cj ; if (2i  2j ) < i j   (Ci Cj), good i has
a greater share in the bundle than good j (k > 1):
(ii) The Schmalensee format of one unit of each good pure bundling
becomes optimal when (i   j)  (Ci   Cj) = (2i   2j ):
(iii) For i  Ci > j  Cj ; if (2i   2j ) > i   j   (Ci  Cj), good j
has a greater share in the bundle than good i (k < 1):
(i) and (iii) set that the good with the higher net mean in consumer
valuations will have a higher (lower) weight if the di¤erence in the net
means is more (less) than the di¤erence in the variances multiplied by the
risk aversion parameter.
In case (ii) the good with the higher net mean valuation has also a
higher dispersion and the di¤erence in the net means is exactly o¤set by
the di¤erences in the variances multiplied by the risk aversion parameter.
As a result each good will receive an equal weight. This means that equal
relative weights is a special case of our approach.
8 This translates into P < : If A > 0 ( < 0) then there can only be corner
solutions where goods are o¤ered separately. This optimality of no bundling when
the demand function is convex is also conrmed by Schmalensee who concludes
that pure bundling is less protable than unbundled sales for P > :
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Clearly case (i) will always be satised if i < j , as then the LHS of
the inequality is negative. In this case good i is superior to good j both in
terms of the net of cost mean, as well as in terms of the variance criterion.
However good i may still be given a greater weight than j in the bun-
dle even when i > j : Hence pure bundling in our model is not always
dispersion reducing, as the latter is not always optimal. As shown in (i) if
the di¤erence in the net means is su¢ciently large then good i will have a
greater weight in the bundle than j despite the fact that i > j . This may
cause the dispersion of the bundle to exceed the sum of the dispersion of
the two stand alone goods. We shall return to this point latter.
Combining Theorem 2 and (i) we obtain the following result. For an
optimal bundling decision such that the good with the higher net mean is
given the higher, but strictly less than one relative weight, the condition is:
2i(i  j)>i   j   (Ci   Cj) > (2i   2j ):
Going back to the case where i < j , it is still possible for good j to
feature in the bundle as long as i > j which will be more easily (always)
satised in the case of a low (negative) value of . Hence low correlation
between the two goods makes bundling more desirable. While this is a result
shared with the Schmalensee paper, given that pure bundling lowers prots
the closer  is to 1, the weight of each good here is determined, among other
things, by the correlation coe¢cient. We show this more formally below, by
rst di¤erentiating k with respect to .
From the expression for k we calculate the derivatives with respect to
these various parameters and we obtain the comparative static results.
As dk

d
= (2 1) (C2 C1)
2(21+
2
2 212) ; the weight of the good with the higher net
mean (e.g. k > 1), is a decreasing function of , the degree of absolute risk
aversion. As implied by the derivative, the higher the degree of risk aversion,
the lower will be the absolute value of its impact on that weight. In other
words, risk aversion encourages bundling by enhancing the contribution of
the weaker good (the one with the lower net mean) into the bundle all other
things being equal.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that if k > 1, dk

d
> 0 , while if
k < 1; dk

d
< 0: In other words, the share of the good with the higher weight
in the bundle is an increasing function of the correlation coe¢cient, , while
the share of the other good is a decreasing function. A lower  boosts the
share of the good with the lower weight in the bundle and improves its odds
of having a non zero participation in the bundle. Therefore low positive
correlation values promote bundling, and even more so negative values of :
As dk

d(1)
=  2(2 k
) 2k1
(21+
2
2 212) < 0 and
dk
d(2)
= (22 1)(2 k
)
(21+
2
2 212) > 0; the
weight of each good is inversely (directly) related to its own (the other
goods dispersion). If the dispersion in the valuations for the other good is
so small that 22   1 < 0; then this implies that 2   1 < 0. It follows
that this may imply that the share of good 1 in the bundle could be less
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than zero if the mean of good 2 is greater than the mean of good 1. In such
a case k = 0:
Regarding the mean dk

d(1)
= 1
(21+
2
2 212) > 0: Hence, the optimal
weight of each good in the bundle is directly related to its mean and, as
can be easily shown, inversely related to the mean of the other good in the
bundle. Also dk

d(C1)
= 1 (21+22 212) < 0; i.e. the optimal weight of each
good in the bundle is inversely related to its cost, and, as can easily be
shown, directly related to the cost of the other good in the bundle.
3.3 Step two: Optimal bundle price
Having derived the optimal weights for the two goods, we now proceed to
derive the prot maximising bundle price. The rm will o¤er the bundle
good at the specic price as a take it or leave it option (pure bundling).
As this composite good consists of Goods 1 and 2, its valuation will be
the weighted sum of the valuations x and y and it will itself be normally
distributed.
We dene the prot function of the composite good, using our prot
function as dened in relation (3) of Section 2. As B;k is the optimal
prot when the weights are set as k = k and 2  k = 2  k, i.e.
B;k = (P

B;k   CB;k)

1  F (P

B;k   B;k
B;k
)

:
Equivalently B;k=2 k is optimal prot when weights are set as k =
2   k = 1, e.g. in the Schmalensee model. B;k is di¤erent to B;k=2 k
unless i   j   (Ci   Cj) = (21   22):
The mean, cost and dispersion of the composite good are dened as:
B;k = k
1 + (2  k)2;
CB;k = k
C1 + (2  k)C2;
B;k =
q
(k)2 21 + (2  k)222 + 2k(2  k)k(1  k),
B;k = (k
1 + (2  k)2)
p
1  2(1  )k(1  k)
where  is the correlation coe¢cient of the joint reservation distribution
and k =
k1
k1+(2 k)2 :
We note the case where the good i whose net mean and dispersion are
both relatively larger also receives a higher weight in the bundle if (2i  
2j ) < i j   (Ci Cj): Setting as k =
p
1  2(1  )k(1  k) (0 
k  1), this means that in this case k1 + (2   k)2 > 1 + 2 and
k  k=2 k. Consequently, B;k > k=2 k. This case is further discussed
as Case 3 in Section 3.4 and it is of particular interest as it is possible that
B;k may even be larger than 1 + 2; if k
1 + (2   k)2 and k are
su¢ciently larger than 1 + 2 and k=2 k respectively.
More generally, the above results imply that optimisation alters the
bundle dispersion in two ways: by a¤ecting k as well as by a¤ecting the
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weighted sum of the two dispersions. k is in our model a function of ;
by di¤erentiating with respect to  we nd that k is an an increasing
(decreasing) function of  when 2 > 1(2 < 1). If the net means of the
two goods are equal, then we have k =
2 1
(1 )(1+2) , which for as long as
2 > 1 guarantees a positive weight for good 1.
Using relation (10) in Section 2, it is easy to calculate in an analogous
manner that
@B
@(B;k CB;k ) = 2
h
1  F (P

B;k B;k
B;k
)
i
, which means that:
0 <
@B;k
@(B;k   CB;k) < 2: (20)
The derivative of the optimal prot with respect to the variance of the
bundle is:
@B;k
@2B;k
=
1
2
B;k
@B;k
@B;k
=
 
P B;k   B;k
2 (B;k)
2
!
1  F (P

B;k   B;k
B;k
)

:
(21)
Corresponding range of values and expressions can be derived for
@WB;k
@(B;k CB;k )
(0 <
@WB;k
@(B;k CB;k ) < 3) and
@WB;k
@2
B;k
respectively.9 These will be of rele-
vance in the discussion below.
3.4 Welfare and policy implications of two stage bundling in relation to
conventional pure bundling
In order to analyse the consumer and welfare implications of our pure
bundling and make comparisons with the conventional equal weights bundling
found in Schmalensees model we consider three cases.
Using the small increments formula we can dene an approximate equal-
ity for the di¤erence between the welfare in our model minus the welfare in
the conventional equal weights bundling as W B;k :
W B;k =
@W B;k
@(B;k   CB;k)nm +
@W B;k
@2B;k
var: (22)
We set as nm = B;k  CB;k   (B;k=2 k  CB;k=2 k) the di¤erence
in the net bundle means of our model minus that of Schmalensees pure
bundling. We also dene var = 
2
B;k   2B;k=2 k, which is the di¤erence
in the variance of the bundle in our model minus the bundle variance in the
1:1 bundling model.
Case 1 i   Ci > j   Cj and i < j :
9 The derivations of these can be found in the mathematical appendix of the
Dassiou & Glycopantis 2011 paper as relations (50) and (51) respectively.
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Then k > (2 k); nm > 0 and var < 0: Since prot is an increasing
function of the net mean and a decreasing function of the dispersion, we have
thatB;k = 

B;k=2 k. The impact of using optimal bundling on consumer
surplus is ambiguous. According to the ndings from Section 2, consumer
surplus is an increasing function of both the net mean as well as dispersion
(as P B;k < B;k).
Inspecting the impact on welfare, if (P B;k  CB;k)2   22B;k > 0 then
@WB;k
@2
B;k
< 0 as derived from relation (17) in Section 2. A smaller bundle
dispersion increases welfare, and this is further reinforced by a larger bundle
mean. Hence in this case our bundling is superior to Schmalensees both in
terms of the prots as well as the total welfare.
On the other hand, if (P B;k CB;k)2 22B;k < 0 10 , then
@WB;k
@2
B;k
> 0:
A larger net mean would still increase welfare, but this will have to be com-
pared to the reduction in welfare from a smaller bundle dispersion. Hence,
in this case it is unclear whether the reduction in welfare is smaller or larger
than the decrease in welfare induced in the pure bundling of Schmalensee.
In other words, while dispersion is further reduced by our brand of pure
bundling, the bundle net mean is increased. The latter can more or less
than o¤set the negative impact on welfare of a larger reduction in the for-
mer. We attempt to bring some clarity to this ambiguity below.
It can be shown that:
var =
nm

+nm
22   21
(2   1)  (C2   C1)
22 + 
2
1 + 212(1  2)
21 + 
2
2   212
:
(23)
As in Case 1 var < 0 and nm > 0; we have that nm < jvarj if and
only if
(22   21)
(1   2)  (C1   C2)
22 + 
2
1 + 212(1  2a)
21 + 
2
2   212
> 1 +
1

: (24)
Comparing the size of the rate of change of welfare with respect to the
variance to that of the rate of change with respect to the net mean we
establish (see Dassiou & Glycopantis 2011) that the absolute size of the
former is smaller than the size of the latter, i.e.
@WB;k@2
B;k
 < @WB;k@(B;k CB;k ) :
Hence, W B;k  0 if
@WB;k
@2
B;k
 0, or if @W

B;k
@2
B;k
> 0; and nm  jvarj.
The change in welfare W B;k will still be non-negative even if
@WB;k
@2
B;k
> 0;
and nm < jvarj ; unless the following proposition (proved in Dassiou &
Glycopantis, 2011) holds:
10 As
P
B;k
 CB;k

B;k
<
p
2 implies that P B;k is below the critical value B;k  
0:147
B;k
.
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Proposition 1 W B;k < 0 if and only if
@WB;k
@2
B;k
> 0;nm < jvarj and
jvarj
nm
=
2B;k=2 k 2B;k
B;k CB;k (B;k=2 k CB;k=2 k) >
@W
B;k
@(B;k CB;k )
@W
B;k
@2
B;k
:
In other words the case where our type of bundling is welfare inferior
to that of the conventional approach is relatively rare. It occurs only when
the ratio of the absolute value of the change in the bundle variance to the
change in the bundle net mean exceeds the fraction of the marginal rate of
change of welfare with respect to the net mean divided by the marginal rate
of change with respect to the variance, provided that the latter is positive.
Below we discuss Cases 2 and 3 in which there is a trade o¤ as far as the
rm is concerned. It faces a dilemma as the good with the larger net mean
also has a larger dispersion. Therefore it has to choose between its desire to
increase the former and decrease the latter in order to enhance its prots.
Case 2 i   Ci > j   Cj ; i > j and i   j   (Ci   Cj) < (2i   2j ).
Then k < (2   k); nm < 0 and var < 0: Hence both the mean as
well as the dispersion are smaller than that in conventional pure bundling.
The inequality i j   (Ci Cj) < (2i  2j ) means that in this case the
overriding criterion for the company in setting the bundle weights is a de-
crease in dispersion rather than an increase in the bundle net mean. Hence,
the optimal weights chosen by the rm will not only produce a smaller dis-
persion relative to that of conventional bundling, but also a smaller bundle
mean. As a result, consumer surplus will be smaller than that in the equal
weights bundling as it is an increasing function of both the mean as well
as the dispersion. This means that Case 2 is a case where a competition
authority is justied to intervene if its primary objective is the protection
of consumer surplus.
We now turn our attention to the overall welfare implications. Given
that both var and nm are negative, if
@WB;k
@2
B;k
> 0 then both terms in the
small increments formula will be negative and welfare will unambiguously
decrease. Only in the case where
@WB;k
@2
B;k
< 0 and jnmj < jvarj we will
have to weight the overall positive impact of the change in the variance
against the overall negative impact of the change in the net mean in small
increments formula. Then it follows that (Dassiou & Glycopantis, 2011):
Proposition 2 W B;k > 0 if and only if
@WB;k
@2
B;k
< 0; jnmj < jvarj and
jvarj
jnmj =
2B;k=2 k 2B;k
(B;k=2 k CB;k=2 k) (B;k CB;k)
>
@W
B;k
@(B;k CB;k )




@W
B;k
@2
B;k





:
Case 3 i   Ci > j   Cj ; i > j and i   j   (Ci   Cj) > (2i   2j ).
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Then k > (2 k); nm > 0 andvar > 0: Here the overriding criterion
for the company in setting the bundle weights is an increase in the bundle
mean rather than a decrease in dispersion. Clearly, the assignment of a larger
relative weight to the good with the larger dispersion in valuations will mean
that consumer surplus will denitely be larger than that of the conventional
case of equal relative weights pure bundling as the company constructs a
composite good whose mean and dispersion are both larger. This will lead to
a larger consumer surplus on both counts. This is one case where the policy
makers should view bundling in variable proportions favourably as such a
strategy followed by the company is very likely to increase consumer and
welfare surplus as compared to the case where pure bundling is restricted to
xed proportions.11This stance is further strengthened if the weight assigned
to the good with the relatively larger mean and variance is such that B;k
is even be larger than 1 + 2:
3.5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed a pure bundling model which reects eco-
nomic reality and decisions better that the conventional assumption made
in the literature. In our discussion we break away from the usual approach
which assumes that the two goods form a bundle of a xed 1:1 ratio. Instead
we obtain the optimal participation of the goods in the bundle through the
maximisation of the utility function. This captures through an absolute risk
aversion parameter the attitude of the rm as regards demand valuation
dispersion.
While the corresponding bundle price is obtained through maximising
prots, our model has the distinct characteristic that the rm is not simply
interested in prot, but also in taking only an acceptable level of risk as
dened through the optimal bundle composition.
We proceed to consider the consumer surplus and welfare implication of
our bundling approach. We distinguish between three di¤erent cases charac-
terized by the relation between the net means and dispersions of the implied
marginal distributions for the two goods.
In Case 1, the inequalities in the di¤erences in the net means and disper-
sions are in opposite directions and the company will end up with a smaller
bundle dispersion that the one obtained in conventional bundling, while
achieving a large prot through a larger bundle mean. If welfare depends
11 The case of W B;k < 0 is quite remote: First, we need P

B;k to exceed
the critical value B;k   0:147B;k for
@W
B;k
@2
B;k
< 0 - by inspection of the
normal distribution tables there is only a 7% probability of this happening. Addi-
tionally, we need nm < var and
var
nm
=
2
B;k
 2B;k=2 k
B;k CB;k (B;k=2 k CB;k=2 k)
>
@W
B;k
@(B;k CB;k )





@W
B;k
@2
B;k





for W B;k < 0:
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positively on dispersion it is possible that optimal bundling will have an ad-
verse e¤ect on welfare, which is however tempered by the fact that impact
of a larger bundle mean. Unless the dispersion of our bundling method is
so substantially smaller than that of the conventional bundling that the im-
pact on the net means is not su¢cient to o¤set the damage this will do, our
exible weights bundling will cause less welfare damage than conventional
bundling does.
Case 2 is characterized by the fact that (i) the di¤erences in the net
means and dispersions are in the same direction and (ii) the di¤erence in the
net means is smaller than that in the variances multiplied by the parameter
of risk aversion. The rm will have bundle net mean and variance smaller
than the ones derived in conventional bundling as it will attach a lower
weight to the good with the higher dispersion and larger net mean. This
a¤ects adversely both the consumer surplus and welfare to a larger extent
than conventional xed weights bundling does.
Case 3 is characterized by the fact that (i) the di¤erences in the net
means and dispersions are in the same direction and (ii) the di¤erence in the
net means is larger than that in the variances multiplied by the parameter
of risk aversion. The rm will construct a package with a larger variance in
tastes by attaching a larger weight to the good with the relatively larger
dispersion. The composite good with also have a larger net mean. This will
have a benecial e¤ect in both consumer surplus and welfare relative to that
of xed equal weights.
Finally we note that the existence of risk aversion makes it possible
to have cases of optimal pure bundling where there is no conict between
the bundling decisions of the rm and its e¤ects on society. If the optimal
weights are such that the reduction in bundle dispersion is substantial we
may end up with B;k > 1 + 2: This means that optimal pure bundling
will in this case lead to an increase rather than a decrease in the dispersion
not only relative to conventional bundling, but also in relation to the case
of separate selling of the two goods.
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